摘要
我国上市公司存在利用表外负债、名股实债和会计手段进行杠杆操纵的行为.杠杆操纵会进一步推高公司真实杠杆水平,弱化监管部门对上市公司杠杆水平的监督力度,粉饰去杠杆效果,从而可能导致更大程度的企业财务风险和系统性金融风险.基于此,在扼要总结我国上市公司杠杆操纵手段的基础上,开创性地提出了杠杆操纵的测度方法--XLT-LEVM法,并基于2007年~2017年我国非金融类上市公司样本数据,对我国上市公司杠杆操纵程度进行了测度,也对杠杆操纵诱因进行了实证检验.研究发现,我国上市公司确实存在杠杆操纵行为,公司账面杠杆率越高、融资约束程度越大以及去杠杆压力越强,公司杠杆操纵程度越大.这些研究结论不仅丰富和深化了上市公司杠杆问题方面的研究,更为今后杠杆操纵相关问题的研究提供了理论和方法基础,也为强化我国资本市场监管和优化去杠杆效果评价提供了政策参考.
Listed companies in China may use off-balance sheet liabilities,non-share-real-debts and accounting methods for leverage manipulation.Leverage manipulation will further push up a company’s real leverage,weaken the supervision of the regulatory authorities on the leverage of listed companies,polish the de-leverage effect,and eventually lead to greater corporate financial risk and systemic financial risk.After a summary of the leverage manipulation methods of listed companies in China,our paper proposes a method of leverage manipulation,XLT-LEVM,based on the sample data of non-financial listed companies in China from 2007 to 2017.It finds that there are exactly leverage manipulations in listed companies.The higher the book leverage and degree of financial constraints,as well as the stronger the deleveraging pressure,the higher the real leverage will be.These results can not only enrich and deepen the research on the leverage problem of listed companies,but also provide theoretical and methodological basis for research on the related issues of leverage manipulation in the future.We ycan also provide policy references for strengthening the supervision of China’s capital market and optimizing the evaluation of de-leveraging effect.
作者
许晓芳
陆正飞
汤泰劼
XU Xiao-fang;LU Zheng-fei;TANG Tai-jie(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Bejjing 100871,China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第7期1-26,共26页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972005,71902001)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2018M641100)
教育部人文社科青年基.金资助项目(17YJC630190)
北京大学光华管理学院“光华思想力”资助项目.
关键词
杠杆操纵
手段
测度
诱因
leverage manipulation
method
measure
inducement
