摘要
本文提供理论模型分析网购拼单机制分别给销售者和消费者带来的影响,为销售者(消费者)的抉择提供参考。研究结果显示,当拼单价格和正常价格均很低时,销售者(消费者)无动机实施(参与)拼单机制。但随着正常价格的提高,拼单机制的营利能力(消费者剩余)会不断增大,进而激励销售者(消费者)实施(参与)拼单机制,并有会将低估价类型消费者驱逐出市场。这一结果从另一个方面反映了拼单机制的最终目标不是为了迎合低估价类型的消费者,而是为了吸引高估价类型的消费者参与交易。进一步地,在拼单机制有效实施的情形下,最优拼单数量、最优期望收益均与两种类型消费者估值比例密切相关。所以,在实施拼单机制过程中,应该有意识地对消费者进行细分,并挖掘不同类型消费者的私人信息,从而制定有效的拼单策略。
Based on the innovative marketing mode with two sale prices,over the last two years,online interpersonal group buying mode have rapidly become popular among many sellers and consumers in China.However,in relevant literature,there aren’t the theoretical analysis relating to the interpersonal group-buying mechanism or comparative studies of interpersonal group buying and traditional selling(such as uniform-pricing trading)have been found.In order to fill this research gap,the uniform-pricing trading is added for comparison in order to explore differences between interpersonal group buying and uniform-pricing trading in terms of profitability and consumers’surplus.In the research process,this paper focuses on segmenting the consumer population to reduce the dispersion of consumer value to extract consumer surplus.Furthermore,for the same goods,consumer value under the separate selling mode may be more dispersed than the value under the interpersonal group buying mode.Thus,the separate selling mode is added to compare and analyse the profitability and consumer surplus of the separate selling mode and interpersonal group buying mode to provide more insights for sellers and consumers.Under the separate selling mode,if there are many H-consumers(i.e.,consumers who give a higher valuation of the product or who have higher price estimations),then it will be effective for sellers to adopt a high price strategy;alternatively,if there is a large consumer population,then the lower price strategy will also attract L-consumers(i.e.,consumers who give a lower valuation of the product or who have lower price estimations for the product).However,only one sale price tends to not be optimal because the price is set before the uncertainty is resolved.The results show that,under the interpersonal group buying mode,sellers will simultaneously set the regular price(i.e.,the high price)and the group-buying price(i.e.,the low price),making them effective in the context of demand uncertainty.Therefore,the interpersonal group buying mode will produce a higher expected profit than that of the separate selling mode,and therefore,sellers will be motivated to use the interpersonal group buying mode.Furthermore,consumers are not motivated to participate in the interpersonal group buying mechanism when both interpersonal group buying price and normal price are low.However,as the normal price increases,the consumer surplus of the interpersonal group buying mechanism will continue to increase,which in turn will encourage consumers to participate in the mechanism,and will expel the low-value consumers.From another aspect,the results reflect that the ultimate goal of the mechanism is not to cater to low-value consumers,but to attract high-value consumers to participate in transactions.Further,in the effective implementation of the mechanism,the optimal interpersonal group buying number and the optimal expected returns are closely related to the ratio of the two types of consumers.Therefore,in the process of implementing the mechanism,the consumers should be consciously subdivided and the private information of different types of consumers should be explored to formulate an effective interpersonal group buying strategy.Finally,the case of"Pinduoduo.com"is introduced,and the validity of related propositions is validated with actual data,and corresponding policy recommendations are provided.
作者
胡凤英
周正龙
卢新元
浦徐进
HU Feng-ying;ZHOU Zheng-long;LU Xin-yuan;PU Xu-jin(Business School,Hubei University,Wuhan 430062,China;School of Information Management,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China;School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214122,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第6期146-157,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划资助项目(18YJAZH068)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2019M652682)
湖北省博士后科技活动项目择优资助项目(2018Z37)
中央高校青年学术创新团队资助项目(CCNU19TD013)
中央高校自主探索创新资助项目(CCNU18TS040)
中央高校青年教师资助项目(CCNU20QN016)。
关键词
电商交易
网购拼单机制
拼单策略
消费者细分
E-commerce trading
online interpersonal group-buying mechanism
group-buying strategy
consumer segmentation
