摘要
中国的创新创业大潮催生了大量初创型科技企业,其中的部分企业科技资本与企业家人力资本并不必然重合,从而导致科技资本成为独立于风险资本、企业家人力资本之外的一支内生力量。这类企业由于自身的科技含量较高,往往受到政府引导基金的青睐,相互之间会形成一种关系型融资格局。在传统委托代理理论基础上,以长期重复博弈模型为工具,结合风险投资领域内更加富有调整弹性能力的关系型融资契约设计,模拟推导了这类科技创业企业最优稳态关系型融资契约的演化过程,以及由此引发的在不同初始控制权配置情境下实现委托方和代理方双边激励的条件。
The tide of innovation and entrepreneurship in China has given birth to a large number of hightech start-ups. Their technological capital becomes an independent force from venture capital and entrepreneur human capital since it is not always in sync with the latter. The start-ups often attract government-guided funds due to their technological advantage, establishing a pattern of relational financing(RF) between the two parties. Based on traditional principal-agent theory, the research of this paper, by combining a long-term repetitive game model with more flexible RF contract of venture capital, simulates the evolvement of startups’ optimal steady-state RF contract, and the requirement of bilateral incentive between principals and agents under different allocation of initial control power.
作者
姜安印
张庆国
JIANG An-yin;ZHANG Qing-guo(Research Center for the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China)
出处
《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期103-112,共10页
Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）
基金
国家社会科学后期资助项目(19FJLB036)。
关键词
科技资本
创业
初创型科技企业
统委托代
委托方
代理方
控制权
technological capital
entrepreneurship
high-tech start-ups
unified entrustment
principal
agent
control power
