摘要
为了探究我国征地冲突发生的根本原因,从权力视角,运用网络交换论和实验经济学解析了征地冲突形成的动因。研究发现,地方政府与被征地人之间存在利益博弈空间是征地冲突的诱因;征地冲突困境形成的关键在于政府与被征收人之间存在内含式连接网,政府的弱权地位使被征收人具有更强的利益博弈能力;设计了内含-虚无式网络和内含-排他式网络对征地拆迁冲突困境进行了改善,发现在内含式的网络中加入排他式或虚无式连接关系可以极大地削弱征地拆迁内含式网络的效应,协商议价的时间相较于内含式网络有所缩减。为了减少征地冲突的发生,从改变征地拆迁网络结构、补偿形式多样化和建立援助机制等三个方面提出了对策建议。
In order to identify the root cause of China’s land acquisition conflicts,the network exchange theory and experimental economics method are used in the paper to analyze the causes of land acquisition conflict,based on the perspective of power. The results show that the land acquisition conflict is caused by the existence of the interest game space between the local government and the land expropriated residents. The key for the formation of land acquisition conflict lies in the internal connection network between the local government and the land expropriated residents. The government’s weak power position lets the land-expropriated residents have a stronger interest game ability. The embedded-virtual network and embedded-exclusive network are designed to improve the land acquisition conflict. This paper also finds that integrating the exclusive or virtual connection relationship into an embedded network can strongly weaken the embedded network’s effects of land acquisition,and the negotiation time between the local government and the land expropriated residents can also be reduced. In order to reduce the occurrence of land acquisition conflicts,countermeasures and suggestions are given from three aspects,changing the network structure of land acquisition,diversification of compensation forms and establishing aid mechanism.
作者
刘广平
陈立文
LIU Guang-ping;CHEN Li-wen(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
北大核心
2019年第12期21-28,共8页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
河北省社会科学基金（HB18GL034）
关键词
网络交换
征地冲突
实验经济学
利益博弈
Network exchange theory
Land-acquisition conflict
Power
Formation cause
Experimental economics
