摘要
保险作为一种重要的风险管理工具,对缓解科技型中小企业融资困境有重要意义。本文基于我国科技型中小企业履约保证保险贷款这一具体的金融实践,考虑一个由政府、银行、保险公司和科技企业组成的系统,构建了风险不确定情形下以银行和科技企业作为主要博弈方的Stackelberg博弈模型,求解了银行与科技企业的均衡策略,并通过数值分析进一步讨论了保险费率与政府补贴行为对均衡的影响。研究结果表明:购买履约保证保险有助于科技企业抵御风险,扩大生产,同时科技企业购买保险也有助于银行获得更高的期望收益,达到双赢效果。此外,数值分析结果还表明,相比于政府机构直接对科技企业进行补贴,通过对保险机构的风险补偿来降低科技企业保险费率的间接补贴机制往往更为有效。本文的研究为解决科技型中小企业融资难的问题提供了参考。
As an important risk management tool, insurance plays an important role in alleviating the financing dif- ficulties of high-teeh enterprise. Based on a specific financial practice - the performance guarantee insurance loan for Chinese high-tech enterprise, this paper considered a system consisting of government, banks, insurance compa- nies and high-tech enterprises. By setting up a Stackelberg Game Model whose main players were banks and high- tech enterprises under a risk-uncertain situation, this paper concluded an equilibrium strategy for banks and high- tech enterprises, and further discussed the impacts of insurance premiums and government subsidies on the equilib- rium through a numerical analysis. The results showed that the purchase of performance guarantee insurance pro- duced a win-win situation. It not only helped high-tech enterprises withstand risks and expand production, but also helped banks obtain higher expected earnings. In addition, the numerical analysis also suggested that compared with direct government subsidies for high-tech enterprises, indirect government subsidies such as subsidizing the risk of insurance companies was more effective for reducing the premium rate for high-tech enterprises. The paper provides a reference for overcoming the financing difficulties of high-tech enterprises.
作者
季昱丞
徐维军
赵琪
JI Yucheng;XU Weijun;ZHAO Qi
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期91-100,110,共11页
Insurance Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"基于文本挖掘风险指标的信用违约资产定价及配置研究"(No.71771091)"多设备在线租赁优化模型与竞争策略研究"(71471065)
广东省科技计划项目"科技金融新常态下广东省科技保险创新及对策研究"(2017A070706004)
