摘要
不同所有制性质的风险投资基金往往面临不同的代理问题,从而导致不同的绩效表现。根据所有制性质不同,风险投资基金可以划分为三类:一是政府主导型基金。尽管政府资金可以降低高科技企业的融资成本,但是可能缺乏有效的监管,代理成本往往很高。二是风险投资家型基金。尽管风险投资家监管可以降低代理成本,但是监管成本与高回报率要求却又会增加高科技企业的融资成本。三是政府引导型基金。它既可以利用风险投资家来降低代理成本,又可以让企业家获取到廉价的政府资金来降低企业的融资成本。本文模型推导表明:(1)当企业家的代理问题很严重,且项目不确定性很高时,政府引导型基金的可获得性最高,而政府主导型和风险投资家型基金的可获得性均很低。(2)政府引导型基金会遭受合谋问题,但政府主导型基金的寻租问题却严重得多。(3)政府引导型基金比政府主导型基金的挤出效应更低。实际上,本文能较好地解释为什么政府引导型基金比较成功但政府主导型基金却比较失败。
The venture capital funds with different ownership often have different agency problems, which result in varied performances. According to ownership, the venture capital funds can be classified into three categories. The first is government-dominated fund. Although the government capital may reduce the financing costs from high-tech enterprises, the lack of effective supervision often cause high agency costs. The second is venture capitalist fund. Although the supervision from venture capitalist could reduce the agency costs, the supervision costs and the requirement of high return will increase the financing costs from high-tech enterprises. The third is government-guided fund. It not only make the best of venture capitalist to reduce agency costs, but also enable the entrepreneurs to get low-cost government capital to reduce the financing costs from enterprises. This paper proves that, （ 1 ） the availability of the government-guided fund is the highest when the agency problems from entrepreneurs are severe and the uncertainty of projects are very high, while the availability of both the government-dominated fund and the venture capitalist fund is lower; （2）although government-guided fund can suffer from the collusion problem, but the rent-seeking problem is much more severe in government-dominated fund; （3） government-guided fund has a lower crowding-out effect than government-dominated fund. In fact, this paper explains why government-guided fund is more successful but government-dominated fund very failure.
作者
燕志雄
张敬卫
费方域
Yan Zhixionga Zhang Jingweia and Fei Fangyub(Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第9期132-146,共15页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"推动经济发达地区产业转型升级的机制与政策研究"(71333007)
国家自然科学基金项目(71102042)
暨南大学科研培育与创新基金项目
暨南大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(15JNKY001)
广东省软科学项目(2012B070300034)
广东产业转型升级协同创新中心
广东产业发展与粤港澳台区域合作研究中心的资助
关键词
代理问题
风险投资基金
监管
共谋
寻租
Agency Problem
Venture Capital Fund
Monitoring
Supervision
Rent-seeking
