摘要
高层管理者的行为关系公司的长远发展,因此如何建立针对高层管理者的激励机制,防止其对所有者利益的背离成为学界探讨公司治理制度的核心议题之一,高管股权激励成为解决委托-代理问题的一个良好工具。我国高管股权激励起步较晚,虽近年来出台了一系列法律法规予以完善,但对上市公司激励目标的实现较为有限。本文在对国内外有关研究进行梳理的基础上,选取我国采用期权和限制性股票激励模式的上市公司典型作比较分析,并以2013—2016年在A股市场首次实施股权激励计划的公司为样本进行实证检验,发现股权激励对我国上市公司经营业绩并没有明显的正向促进作用,但相对于限制性股票的股权激励模式,股票期权具有更好的激励作用。本文据此进一步探讨了我国上市公司高管股权激励问题的启示和改进方向。
Executive behaviors are associated to a company＇s long-term development,and how to establish the incentive mechanism of an executive to prevent the department of proprietary interests has become one of the key research topics of corporate governance.Executive equity incentive is a good method to coping with the principal-agent conflict.China is still in her infancy to develop the executive equity incentive mechanism.Though a series of laws and regulations have been adopted an recently,they have limited effects on listed companies to achieve their incentive goals.Based on a sound literature review,this paper makes a comparative analysis of the listed companies that have adopted an incentive mode of options and restricted stocks,followed by an empirical analysis of the samples from the A-share market which first implemented the equity incentive plan from 2013 to 2016.We finds that there is no positive incentive effect on the business performance of listed companies literally,but the incentive of options seems to be slightly better than that of restricted stocks.The study further discusses the directions of improvements about China＇s listed companies＇ equity incentive mode corresponding to aforementioned analysis.
作者
欧丽慧
陈天明
李真
OU Li-hui;CHEN Tian-ming;LI Zhen(Professional Degree Education Center,Faculty of Economics and Management,East China Normal University,Shanghai,200062,China;Faculty of Economics and Management,Faculty of Economics and Management,East China Normal University,Shanghai,200062,China)
出处
《管理案例研究与评论》
CSSCI
2018年第3期303-318,共16页
Journal of Management Case Studies
关键词
股权激励
经营绩效
比较分析
多元回归
equity incentive
business performance
comparative analysis
multi-variable regression
