摘要
为深化行政垄断企业混合所有制改革,对比了2006-2015年中国5个行政垄断行业和1个经济垄断行业上市公司的数据,未能发现混改带来的显著效果。运用衡量股权结构与企业绩效关系的模型,通过计量检验发现:混合所有制股权集中度与企业绩效之间没有显著相关关系;国有、私有和外资三种股权虽然均与企业绩效正相关,但混改的作用尚未得到有效发挥。为了进一步分辨行政垄断企业绩效的来源,使用邹检验发现,主要是行政垄断而不是股权结构因素导致行政垄断与经济垄断企业之间的绩效产生了结构性改变,这说明非国有股权仅仅在搭行政垄断的便车,并未发挥应有的"鲶鱼效应"。在混改中应落实私有资本"责、权、利"的统一性,在混改后应大力提升公司治理水平,加快弱化、去除行政垄断因素。
In order to deepen the mixed ownership reform of administrative monopoly enterprises, this paper makes a comparison of the data of listed companies of Chinese five major administrative monopoly industries and one economy monopoly industry from the year of 2006 to 2015, which doesn＇t show the significant effect of mixed modification. It further utilizes the model to measure the relationship between mixed ownership structure and the performance, and finds that there is no significant correlation between equity concentration and the performance and there is positive significant correlation between state-owned, private and foreign equities and the performance but the role of the mixed ownership reform has not been effectively played. Furthermore, this paper uses Chow test to distinguish the sources of performance of the administrative monopoly enterprises and finds that it is the administrative monopoly factor but not ownership structure that gives rise to structural change between these two types of monopoly enterprises. That declares that private equity just takes a free ride on the administrative monopoly and fails to play the ＂catfish effect＂. It suggests that, in the reform we should pay attention to the unity of ＂responsibility, power and interest＂ of private capital, and after the reform, we should vigorously promote the governance level of the mixed ownership companies and accelerate the weakening and removal of administrative monopoly factors.
出处
《企业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第7期111-119,共9页
Enterprise Economy
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"垄断结构下的中国经济增长机制与转型路径研究:基于嵌入行政垄断的政府竞争框架"(项目编号:14YJC790031)
山东省高校科研发展计划项目"山东省国有企业混合所有制改革的落实及深化研究"(项目编号:J17RA087)
关键词
混合所有制股权结构
绩效
行政垄断
mixed ownership structure
performance
administrative monopoly
