摘要
本文分析了董事高管责任保险(简称"董责险")的购买对财务报表重述(简称"财务重述")的影响及其作用机理。我们发现董责险的购买减少公司财务重述。通过工具变量法等控制潜在的内生性问题后,结论依然稳健。进一步研究显示,董责险对财务重述的抑制作用在监督机制较弱(不聘用国际四大会计师事务所进行年报审计、机构投资者持股比例低)的公司里更为显著。渠道测试显示,购买董责险的上市公司通过提高内部控制质量来减少财务重述的发生。本文的结论表明董责险在中国上市公司中发挥着积极治理作用,为董责险在新兴市场中的治理效应提供新的经验证据。同时,我们的发现也为中国监管部门发展、监管董责险提供有意义的参考。
This study investigates the impact of directors＇ and officers＇ liability insurance （D＆O insurance） on financial restatements and the eco- nomic mechanism. We find that the purchase of D＆O insurance decreases financial restatements. Our result is robust after controlling the potential endog- enous issue using the instrumental variable method. Further analyses suggest that the impact of D＆O insurance on financial restatements is more significant when a firm does not hire Big4 audit firms to audit its annual reports, or owns lower percentage of institutional investors＇ ownership. Moreover, we find the channel through which D＆O insurance reduces financial restatements： internal control quality. Our results indicate that D＆O insurance plays a gov- eruance role in China, thus adding an interesting and important piece to the literature on the governance role of D＆O insurance in emerging markets. Our findings are also beneficial to regulators, finns, and investors in China.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期21-27,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目(17XNB031)成果
关键词
董事高管责任保险
财务报表重述
公司治理
内部控制
Directors＇ and Officers＇ Liability Insurance
Financial Restatements
Corporate Governance
Internal Control
