摘要
本文以财务重述为研究视角,在考察控股程度与控股股东性质交叉作用的基础上,研究股权结构的治理效率。研究结果显示,在没有绝对控股股东的情况下,无论公司第一大股东的最终控制人是国有还是非国有性质,其发生财务重述的可能性都比国有控股上市公司发生财务重述的可能性显著要高;在绝对控股条件下,最终控制人为非国有性质的上市公司发生财务重述的可能性比国有性质的公司发生财务重述的可能性显著要低。研究结论表明,分散化的股权和国有股权对公司管理层的制约效果相对较差,从而使公司进行盈余操纵的可能性更高。本文借助公司财务重述行为,深化了已有公司治理方面的研究,并为监管部门和投资者的决策提供重要依据。
Ownership structure is a determinant of efficiency of corporate governance. This paper examines the efficiency of ownership structure through financial restatements in two dimensions of control fight and ultimate shareholders. I find that, when a company is absolute controlled, its probability of restatements occurrence decreases. I also find that when a company is absolute controlled by non-state shareholders, its probability of restatements occurrence is lower than a company controlled by state shareholders. The result indicates that decentralized ownership and state ownership has less efficiency in monitoring managers, so the insiders have more opportunities to manipulate earnings. This study extends research in corporate governance, and provides evidence to supervisors and investors in decision-making.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第9期134-144,共11页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金"会计规范全球协调与趋同中的根本性问题研究"(项目批准号:70672115)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
公司治理
股权结构
盈余操纵
财务重述
Corporate Governance
Ownership Structure
Earnings Manipulation
Financial Restatements
