摘要
网络合作博弈主要研究如何将联盟收益分配给网络合作联盟的每个参与者.考虑到现实生活中很多联盟倾向于保留一部分合作收益用于再发展的情况,对网络合作博弈模型进行扩展,定义广义分配、广义核心和广义谈判集等解的概念,并证明当满足超可加性时,网络合作博弈的广义核心与其广义谈判集存在等价性质.因广义谈判集非空,进而刻画了网络合作博弈广义核心的非空性.算例分析结果表明了广义分配方案的存在性及合理性.
The network cooperative game mainly studies how to distribute the coalition profit to each participant of the network coalition. Considering that many alliances tend to retain part of the profits for redevelopment in the real life, the network game is extended based on the solution definition of the generalized imputation, generalized core and generalized bargaining set, and it is proved that the generalized core of the network cooperative game is equivalent to the generalized reactive bargaining set when the super additive is satisfied. The generalized reactive bargaining set is not empty, and then the nonempty of the generalized core of the network cooperative game is described. Example analysis results show the existence and rationality of the generalized distribution scheme.
作者
李翠
薛惠锋
LI Cui XUE Hui-feng(School of Economics and Management, Xi＇an University of Technology, Xi＇an 710048, China School of Information, Xi＇an University of Finance and Economics, Xi＇an 710100, China School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi＇an 710072, China)
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期1041-1046,共6页
Control and Decision
基金
国防基础科研计划基金项目(A0420131501)
全国经济管理院校工业技术学研究会项目(16GYJS016)
中国(西安)丝绸之路研究院科学研究项目(2016SDZ07
2016SY11)
陕西省教育厅科学研究计划项目(16JK1286)
