摘要
党的十八大五中全会将生态文明建设作为重要发展战略,但生态文明建设的重点"水污染治理"依旧处于困境之中。水污染治理的难点在于水污染规制策略执行人——地方政府与其他利益主体理性目标的差异。基于地方政府间博弈竞争的分析框架,引入中央政府约束和激励机制,分析地方政府间对于水污染规制博弈策略的动态演进行为。研究结果表明,水污染的外部性不会影响地方政府间博弈策略;政府可以通过提高水污染指标在地方政府政绩考核权重,降低水污染规制成本,减弱企业利润对地方政府支付水平的影响程度,构建约束和激励机制来防止地方政府间的博弈陷入"囚徒困境",促使地方政府水污染规制策略的高效执行。
The fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China puts the development of ecological civilization as an important strategy. But now the water pollution governance still was in trouble,and the deep reason lies in the difference among the local governments＇ rational goals. Based on the analysis framework of the game competition among local governments, and introduced the central government restraint and incentive mechanism,this paper analyzes the dynamic evolution behavior of the local government for the regulation of water pollution. The results show that the externality of water pollution wil strategy among local governments. In order to prevent the local governments coming into the not affect the game prisoner＇s dilemma, and to make the local government water pollution regulation strategy efficient implementation, we can improve the water pollution index in local government performance evaluation weight, reduce the cost of water pollution regulation and the impact of corporate profits to local government payment level, construct the mechanism of the central government restraint and incentive.
出处
《国土资源科技管理》
2016年第5期80-85,共6页
Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources
基金
教育部社会科学规划基金资助项目(10YJA790080)
关键词
水污染规制
地方政府
演化博弈
regulation of water pollution
local government levolutionary game
