期刊文献+

创投机构信息共享网络利益分配问题研究 被引量:1

Research on Benefit Distribution Mechanism of Venture Capital Information Cooperation
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 基于Shapley值,提出创投机构信息共享网络利益分配模型。在此基础上,根据创投机构信息搜集成本、信息共享意愿以及信息共享风险特征对Shapley值进行修正,提出考虑多因素下新的利益分配方法。通过实例分析表明,根据Shapley值进行利益分配能够保障创投机构参与信息共享网络积极性,而依据创投机构特征差异进行修正后的Shapley值分配方案更具合理性和可行性。 Firstly, this paper comes up with the benefit distribution model of the venture capital information cooperation based on Shapley value. Based on the analysis of participants characteristics, an amended benefit distribution mechanism is constructed, and this method is applied in solving benefit assignment of capital venture information cooperation. The research concludes that the benefit distribution according to Shapley value method could improve the activity of capital ventures to construct informational network. Fur- thermore, the amended Shapley value method present more fairness and feasibility in the benefit distribution.
出处 《科技与经济》 2015年第4期16-20,共5页 Science & Technology and Economy
基金 浙江省科技计划项目--"浙江省科技金融创新与科技型中小企业发展研究"(项目编号:2014C35045 项目负责人:王斐波)成果之一
关键词 创投机构 信息共享 利益分配 SHAPLEY值 venture capital information share benefit distribution Shapley value method
  • 相关文献

参考文献8

二级参考文献66

共引文献126

同被引文献39

  • 1汪锋.战略联盟的契约设计及其稳定治理[J].工业技术经济,2006,25(8):100-102. 被引量:4
  • 2Cooke P. Global Innovation networks, territory and services innovation[M]//Cuadrado-Roura,Juan R. Serv- ice industries and regions. Berlin Heidelbery: Springer, 2013:109-133.
  • 3Manuel C, Conz~lez-Arangtiena E, van den Brink R. Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the shapley-value [J]- Mathematical Methods of Opera- tions Research, 2013,77(1) :1-14.
  • 4Laffont J J, Martimort D. The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model[D~. Princeton, N J: Prince- ton University Press, 2002.
  • 5Lazear E P. Personnel economics[M]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
  • 6因内斯.马克一斯达德勒,J.大卫.佩雷斯一卡斯特里罗.信息经济学:激励与合约[M].管毅平,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.
  • 7让一雅克.拉丰,大卫.马赫蒂尔.激励理论:委托代理模型[M].陈志俊等译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
  • 8Radner R. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a re- peated principal-agent relationship[J]. Econometrica, 1981,49(5) :1127-1148.
  • 9DeMarzo P M, Fishman M J. Optimal long-term finan- cial contracting with privately observed cash flows[R]. SSRN Working paper series,2004.
  • 10Holmstrom B. Equilibrium long-term contracts [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983,98 : 23 - 54.

引证文献1

二级引证文献47

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部