摘要
在孵化器与创投合作对创业者进行的管理中存在信息不对称,创业者拥有比孵化器和创投更多的内部信息。运用两位委托人和一个代理人的委托代理框架,将孵化器与创投之间的互动行为引入管理问题,探讨创业者的信息是否披露、孵化器与创投是否合作以及两者管理性质对孵化器与创投合作管理的影响。研究表明,创业者是否真实披露其私有信息、孵化器与创投是否合作以及孵化器与创投的管理行为的性质都会影响两者投入的管理成本。不论创业者是否披露其私有信息,孵化器与创投不合作时的管理成本都高于合作时的管理成本;当创业者不愿意披露其私有信息、创投与孵化器不合作时,替代性质的管理成本高于互补性质的管理成本。
In the management of business incubator and venture capital＇s cooperation, there is asymmetric information, entrepreneur has more internal information than incubator and venture capital. The paper uses two agents and a client agency framework to introduce the interactions of the business incubator and the venture capital cooperate to management problems and discuss the management costs whether the self information of entrepreneur is disclosed and whether the business incubator and the venture capital cooperate. The research shows that the entrepreneur is honest to reveal their private information, incubators and venture capital, as well as the co-operation of the incubator and venture capital management behavior will affect the nature of the two investment management costs. Regardless of whether entrepreneur exposes their private information, management costs are more expensive when incubator and venture capital are uncooperative than cooperative. When the entrepreneur is reluctant to reveal his private information and venture capital and incubator are uncooperative, the alternative management costs is higher than complementary costs.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2008年第4期2-7,共6页
Journal of Management Science
基金
教育部科学技术研究重点资助项目(No.99127)
关键词
科技企业孵化器
创投
创业者
委托代理
私有信息
信息租
technology business incubator
venture capital
entrepreneur
principal-agent
private informa-tion
information rents
