摘要
SBOT(Subsidize in Building-Operate-Transfer)作为一种新的BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer)模式,在城市轨道交通项目建设中被推广采用。特许期是SBOT项目特许权协议中的一个关键决策变量。本文利用实物期权和不对称Nash协商理论,提出了一种新的特许期计算方法并依据此方法构建了轨道交通SBOT项目的特许期决策模型,其决策过程分为两步:首先,利用实物期权理论构建了不确定收益下公共部门和私营部门的投资决策模型,求解出特许期的可行域;在此基础上,以特许期为决策变量,结合双边议价机制发展了实物期权模型,构建了特许期的Nash协商模型,并求解出模型的均衡解。最后,对轨道交通SBOT项目特许期决策模型均衡解的性质进行了讨论。
SBOT( Subsidize in Building-Operate-Transfer) as a new Build-Operate-Transfer procurement model has been adopted in the construction of urban rail transit projects. Concession period is a key decision variable in the arrangement of a SBOT-type contract. This paper provides a methodology to determine an optimal concession period in urban rail transit SBOT projects using real option and asymmetric Nash negotiation theory. The optimal concession period can be identified through two procedures: First,real options theory is used to construct decision-making model between public sector and private sector on investment in SBOT projects under dynamic uncertainty arising from the volatility of the operational revenue,and an effective interval for concession period is determined. Furthermore,the research sets concession period as a decision variable,develops the real option model within a bilateral bargaining setting,and puts forward to Nash negotiation model. Then, the paper derives the Nash equilibrium solution. Finally, the research discusses the equilibrium solution's properties of concession period in urban rail transit SBOT project.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期60-65,共6页
Forecasting
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费科研专项人文社会科学类资助项目(CDJSK100155)