摘要
在上市公司治理中,英美国家的独立董事制度与我国的监事会制度具有同质性,独立董事的作用基本上可以通过监事会实现,在某种程度上,后者的监督力度更大,因此,没必要全面引入独立董事制度。我国监事会监督乏力的原因并不在于公司机关设置的错误,而在于没有严格依照专门监管机构的理念界定其具体制度,也没严格行使监督权;目前,我国上市公司的监督体制不必重构,但需加强和完善。
In the governance of publicly-held corporations, the function of the independent-director system in Anglo-American is similar to that of the supervisory-board system in China,whose function can be achieved by means of supervisory-board system,and to some degree the latter is more efficient, so it is unnecessary to introduce the independent-director system to our publicly held corporations. The reason that the supervisory-board system is feeble lies in the unstrictness of establishment and implementation, not the setting of corporation's department. At present, what we should do is to enforce and consummate the supervisory system, but not to rebuild it.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
2002年第2期54-59,共6页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
