摘要
一般认为 ,产权改革是我国国有企业改革的关键。但对于同样属于国有企业的国有商业银行的改革 ,人们却往往把重点放在经营问题上 ,以至无法从根本上提高国有商业银行的效率。本文以我国国有商业银行的贷款量为切入点 ,运用模型和数据说明在产权关系不明晰的前提下 ,政府运用行政手段对银行经营者进行监管的不良效果 。
It's generally thought that the property right reform is the key of the reform of the nation-owned enterprises. But when it comes to the reform of the nation-owned commercial banks, which also belong to the nation-owned enterprises, we always put the emphasis on the banks' management. This thesis begins with the quantity of loan and establishes models to analyze the change of that in the 1990s. Using the models and the collected data, the thesis expresses the negative effect of the administrative supervision to the bank managers under the premise that the property relations are not clear.It proves that the property relation plays a decisive role to the agency-principle problem. We can never solve the management problem without solving the problem of property right.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第3期54-57,62,共5页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
