摘要
本文在一个银行间古诺博弈模型中 ,综合考虑了银行管理者的费用与规模偏好对于银行市场行为的影响。分析结果表明 ,如果银行所有权与控制权分离 ,那么管理者的费用与规模偏好都会导致银行的效率损失 ,虽然原因不尽相同 :规模偏好会诱使管理者选择大于利润最大化所要求的规模水平 ;而费用偏好会诱使管理者增加在职消费 ,减少银行利润。理论上存在的我国国有独资银行非利润偏好行为 ,为两个经验证据所支持 :(1 )国有独资银行规模与配置无效 ;(2 )市场结构假说和效率结构假说检验均未获得经验支持。规模无效意味着国有独资银行存在规模偏好 ;而配置无效意味着国有独资银行存在费用偏好。
This paper shows the effects on banking behavior of banker's cost and scale preference by applying an interbank Cournot game model. It is proved that given the separation between control right and ownership, both scale and cost preference of bankers lead to inefficiency. Scale preference results in an excessive-scale level higher than that of profit maximization, while cost preference lures bankers to increase their personal consumption, and thus cut the profit. This non-profit preference of China's wholly state owned banks (SOBs) are supported by two empirical evidences. The first is the inefficiency of SOBs' scale and allocation. Second, the market structure and efficiency structure hypotheses are rejected by econometric study. Scale inefficiency means scale preference, while allocation inefficiency means cost preference.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第1期63-74,共12页
Journal of Financial Research
