摘要
银行与企业的关系问题已经成为影响我国经济增长的重要因素。由于信息不对称,银行与企业的关系存在很大的不确定性。通过一定的技术手段,比如,担保等,可以使得这种不确定性大大降低。由于银行与企业之间是重复的动态博弈,履约的声誉就成为信息不对称问题的自动约束和消除装置。企业对声誉的关注程度与产权安排相关,不同产权制度的企业,对银企之间的信用契约履约率是不相同的,这可以对我国目前存在的特殊银企关系作出解释。
The relationship between banks and firms has become an important factor affecting China' s economic growth. Because of information asymmetry, there remains uncertainty between banks and firms. However, this uncertainty could be reduced by certain technical measures, such as guarantee and others. Since there is repeated dynamic game between banks and firms so the reputation of performance can be an automatic restriction and solution. Depending on the different equity system, the firms usually take different attitude towards to the reputation and have different ration of execution of credit contract with bank. It can be used to explain the special relation between bank and firm.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第8期48-56,共9页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
信息不对称
银企关系
产权
信用契约关系
声誉
information asymmetry, the relationship between banks and firms, property right
