基于内生视角的高管薪酬激励与公司资本投资研究被引量：5

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Executive Incentives and Corporate Investment—Based on Endogeneity Perspective

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摘要基于内生视角检验了高管薪酬激励机制与公司投资行为之间的交互关系。以我国上市公司高管薪酬制度为背景,选取2004~2010年上市公司数据研究发现：（1）公司投资强度越大导致高管薪酬水平显著降低。公司投资活动通过公司会计业绩显著地影响了高管薪酬水平。（2）基于会计业绩的高管薪酬契约无法对高管长期投资活动产生激励作用,提高高管薪酬水平显著地降低了公司投资强度。而基于股票和期权的激励机制能够显著地提高公司投资强度。（3）进一步研究表明,当期和滞后期的公司投资强度均对高管薪酬水平产生了负面效应,并且影响程度逐渐减弱。（4）研究还发现,高管薪酬业绩敏感性并没有对公司投资产生显著影响。研究结果说明,目前我国上市公司高管薪酬激励机制并没有对公司投资行为产生治理效应。 Based executive incentives and on endogeneity perspective, this paper examines the relationship between corporate investment. By analyzing the institutional settings of Chinese executive incentives and the data of listed companies from 2004 to 2010, we find that：（ 1 ） Higher level of corporate investment leads to a significant reduction of executive compensation. Investment activities affect the level of executive compensation through the company~ accounting performance. （2） Executive compensation contracts based on accounting performance can not improve the level of long-term investment. Executive compensation has negative effect on the corporate investment. But stock-based incentive compensation can significantly improve the level of investment. （ 3 ） Further research shows that current and lagged investment has waning negative effect on executive compensation. （4） Pay- performance sensitivity has no significant effect on investment. This paper shows that executive incentives of Chinese listed companies has no effect to solve the agent problem of corporate investment.

作者徐光伟刘星

机构地区常州大学经济管理学院上海财经大学工商管理博士后流动站重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期56-65,128,共11页 Shanghai Journal of Economics

基金国家自然科学重点基金项目"制度环境公司财务政策选择和动态演化研究"(项目编号:71232004) 常州大学科研启动费"政府管制管理层权力与国企高管激励契约"(ZMF13020006)

关键词代理问题高管薪酬激励契约公司投资薪酬业绩敏感性 agent problem executive compensation incentive contracts corporate investment pay-performance sensitivity

分类号 F244.3 [经济管理—劳动经济]

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