经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究被引量：27

Manager's Over-Investment and Stock Incentives:A Contract Model

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摘要为了获得控制权收益 ,经理层倾向于在有利于维持自身地位的项目上过度投资 ,从而形成了所谓“固守职位”的现象 ,这种行为损害了股东的利益。本文建立了一个简单的股东与经理层之间的契约模型 ,研究了股东如何设计最优契约来降低经理的过度投资问题 ,并考察了经理层过度投资程度与哪些因素有关。比较静态分析表明投资项目的风险状况通过所有者给予经理层的最优股权比例的变化间接影响过度投资程度 ;在存在经理人市场的条件下。 There exist agent costs because of different targets between shareholders and managers.Managers own private information on investment due to information asymmetry.Managers will over-invest in the specific investment for purpose of entrenchment to realize control benefits,which damages the benefit of shareholders.In this paper we build a simple contract model between shareholders and managers.Shareholders offer part of shares to the managers for effective incentives.After obtaining the perfect share ratio to managers,we discuss the comparative static analysis on perfect share ratio and over-investment when risk attitude of managers,investment risk and ability gap between current managers and alternative managers happen to change.

作者王艳孙培源杨忠直

机构地区上海交通大学管理学院

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第1期127-131,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 44 1 0 2 1 )

关键词过度投资委托-代理关系激励 over-investment principal-agent relationship incentives

分类号 F830.2 [经济管理—金融学]

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