摘要
知识权力在技术创新网络结点间多呈非对称分布,这一特征容易导致知识共享不足、知识泄漏风险加大。本文构建了知识共享主从博弈模型,分析了知识权力强弱方知识共享贡献率、创新绩效分配系数、组织间信任、已有知识基础对知识共享的影响,发现各方创新绩效分配系数与知识共享贡献率正相关,知识共享稳定系数对知识共享总量与创新收益均有积极影响,网络中知识共享得以进行的必要条件是知识权力强势方绩效分配系数与弱势方绩效分配系数之和的比值大于知识转化系数+1,绩效分配对知识权力强势方激励效应的敏感度低于对知识权力弱势方的敏感度。
Asymmetrical distribution of knowledge power among the nodes of technological innovation network is likely to lead to such problems as insufficient knowledge sharing and risk of knowledge leakage. In this paper, Stackelberg game model for knowledge sharing has been built through analysis of the effects of knowledge sharing contribution rate of each party in the network, allocation of innovation performance, trust and existing knowledge base on knowledge sharing. After the analysis of model solution and equilibrium, it has been found that there is a positive correlation between performance allocation coefficient and knowledge sharing contribution rate of parties in the advantageous and disadvantageous positions in terms of knowledge power; The essential condition of conducting knowledge sharing is that ratio of allocation coefficient of the party in the advantageous position to sum of performance allocation coefficients of the party in the disadvantageous position is larger than knowledge transformation coefficient plus 1 ; The performance allocation is less sensitive to incentive effect of the party in the advantageous position than that of the party in the disadvantageous position.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期8-14,共7页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972051)
国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(11AZD091)
山西省软科学研究资助项目(2009041002-02)
关键词
技术创新网络
知识共享
行为机理
知识权力
主从博弈
technological innovation network
knowledge sharing
behavior mechanism
knowledge power
Stackelberg game
