摘要
本文研究了引致中国农村地权稳定性变化的因素。农村土地制度被看作是村庄集体决策的结果。土地调整的正面作用是为村民提供一个收入保险机制 ,负面作用是降低地权的稳定性 ,损害村民对土地投资的积极性 ,同时 ,每一次调整都涉及较大的谈判成本。一个村庄是否调整土地是村庄集体在权衡正反面影响之后做出的决策。由于这些影响受当地的经济条件 ,如土地禀赋、收入水平、非农就业机会以及税收等因素的影响 ,地权稳定性的变化呈现出诱导性的特征。本文通过理论分析提出了几个假说 ,并利用 4省 83个村的调查资料对它们进行了计量检验。
This paper studies the factors that have induced the evolution of land tenure security in rural China. Land tenure is modeled as induced institutional change arising from collective decision based on welfare aggregation that weights the benefits of risk pooling provided by periodical land reallocations and their costs associated with negotiation and efficiency losses. Different types of land tenure are found to be induced by local factors including relative factor scarcities. The function of a well-functioning land rental market in bring more individualized land tenure is also explored. The empirical test confirms several major hypotheses proposed by the theory.
出处
《中国农村观察》
CSSCI
2000年第2期11-19,共9页
China Rural Survey
