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高等教育地方分权与地方政府激励关系研究

A Research on Decentralization and Local Governments' Incentives to High Education
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摘要 "地方分权"一直作为分析地方政府竞争力提升的一个外部因素。首先从历史的维度上考察了高等教育地方分权的发展历史,然后分析中央政府对地方政府下放发展高等教育权力的动机和方式,最后研究了地方高等教育分权对地方政府激励的影响。研究认为,高等教育地方政府分权实质是一种行政性权力委托,其直接目的是实现中央政府教育财政负担的转移。在中央政府的强制主导下完成的高等教育地方分权只是集中地反映了中央政府的发展高等教育的某些偏好,由于这一制度变迁缺乏相应的制度安排,扭曲的地方政府激励等一系列问题随之产生。 Decentralization has been used as an external factor to analyze local governments' competitiveness. This paper first takes historical perspective to examine the development of decentralization in higher education, and then analyzes the motivation and forms of right transferred from the central government to local governments, the finally studies the impact of higher education decentralization on local government incentive. Studies suggest that decentralization of higher education is in nature a delegation of administrative rights to local governments, in which the immediate goal is to archive transference of education financial burden of the central government to the localities. With the central government as the decision maker to assign transfer certain universities to the provinces, the process priorities the concerns of the central government only. This defected way of transference has given rise to a series of problems including the inefficient local governments' support of higher education.
作者 何宇 潘光堂
机构地区 四川农业大学
出处 《国家教育行政学院学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第4期33-37,共5页 Journal of National Academy of Education Administration
关键词 高等教育 地方分权 政府激励 higher education decentralization government incentives
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