摘要
运用2009-2012年间我国A股市场上市公司数据,实证分析高管减持对盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明,上市公司中确实存在以配合高管减持为目的的盈余管理行为,减持事件加大了公司正向盈余管理的概率;高管减持幅度越大,公司正向盈余管理的程度也越强;进一步区分高管与董事长两职合一情况后发现,两职合一的上市公司较两职分离的上市公司,其盈余管理的程度更强。
With data of listed companies in 2009 -2012, this paper discusses the impact of share reduction by top execu- tives on earnings management. The results show that the occurrence of reduction has increased the probability of positive earn- ings management; the larger the reduction, the stronger the degree of management. Further studies reveal that companies which have the duality of board chairman and CEO have stronger positive earnings management. These conclusions may help understand the impact of share reduction by top executives on earnings management, and promote the regulation of executive＇s share reduction behavior and protection of the interests of investors.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期56-63,共8页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(11&ZD044)
关键词
高管减持
盈余管理
两职合一
投资者保护
reduction of executive＇s shares
earnings management
duality of chairman and CEO
investor protection
