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股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据 被引量:118

Earnings Management prior to the Public Disclosure of an Equity Incentive Plan:Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China
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摘要 本文以"上市公司股权激励管理办法"颁布以来沪深两市首次披露股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,运用单样本T检验和配对样本T检验的方法,研究了股权激励计划公告日前经理人的盈余管理行为。研究发现:股权激励计划公告日前的三个季度,经理人通过操纵"操纵性应计利润"进行了向下的盈余管理,公告日后盈余存在反转现象;但是,并没有显著的证据表明经理人在股权激励计划公告日前通过操纵"非经常性损益"进行盈余管理。 According to a vast of amount of empirical evidence from the U.S, executives of listed companies may have a strong motive to manipulate earnings management to affect stock prices in order to increase gains during the process of implementing equity incentives. The operation and management of listed companies in China are more easily manipulated and controlled by executives.In the present study, 108 A-Share listed companies were selected to make up the observed sample. All these companies disclosed equity incentive plans 'between 2006 and 2008 after the issuing of the Administration Measures of Equity Incentive of Listed Companies by China Securities Regulatory Commission. Correspondingly being paired with each of observed samples, a company, which was in the same industry, had an approximate total asset and did not adopt an equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2008, was chose as its control sample. The manipulations of earnings management prior to the announcement of an equity incentive plan was investigated by means of simple and paired T-tests employing discretionary accruals and nonrecurring gains and loses as variables of earnings management.The results suggest that the observed listed companies averagely have lower discretionary accruals prior to the announcement of incentive plans compared with the paired control samples. The results of simple and paired T-tests demonstrate that there is a downward earnings management by lowering discretionary accruals during three quarters prior to the announcement of equity incentive plans, and there is reversal in discretionary accruals after the announcement. There are no noticeable results obtained to prove that the executives had conducted a downward earnings management by using nonrecurring gains and loses prior to the announcement of incentive plans.
出处 《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期113-119,127,共8页 Nankai Business Review
基金 北京市科学技术委员会软科学研究项目(Z0004049040811) 北京理工大学"985"工程项目:基础研究基金(1080050320808)资助
关键词 股权激励 盈余管理 操纵性应计利润 非经常性损益 Equity Incentive Earnings Management Discretionary Accruals Nonrecurring Gains and Loses
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参考文献24

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