摘要
讨论垄断竞争条件下电信业定价策略,对理解电信运营商的竞争行为、制定电信业竞争政策有重要的意义。本文将呼叫外部性引入模型,考察了呼叫方内部化接听方效用条件下企业定价策略,从而扩展了目前理论内容和结论。研究表明:当呼叫方内部化接听方的效用时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商仍然会通过提高接入费进行合谋;在非线性定价条件下,由于电信运营商可以利用固定费进行市场份额的争夺,电信运营商不再有利用接入费进行合谋的动机;在基于终接网络的价格歧视条件下,当消费者接听效用接近于呼叫效用时,电信运营商将会通过制定无穷大的呼叫异网价格来获取更大的市场份额,因此网络联接发生了中断。
The Research on the Strategic Pricing of the Firm under the Telecommunication Competition is important to understand the competitive behavior of firms and make policy. This paper investigates the telecommunications operators＇ strategic pricing when there is call externality. The conclusions follow： under linear pricing, access charge is an instrument of tacit collusion. Under nonlinear tariffs, telecommunication operators will compete for the market share by the fixed charge. The tacit collusion disappears. Under network - based price discrimination, network connection will break because the operators will compete for the market share by infinite price when caller＇s utility is as much as receiver＇s.
出处
《产经评论》
CSSCI
2014年第1期87-95,共9页
Industrial Economic Review
关键词
电信竞争
呼叫外部性
定价策略
telecommunication competition
call externality
strategic pricing
