摘要
针对船员选拔过程中信息不对称造成综合素质较低的船员驱逐综合素质较高的船员、聘任期间船员不努力工作并将因懒惰或疏忽而导致较差的工作完成情况甚至是安全事故归咎于不利的外部环境(较差的海况、船舶设备工况等),本文结合信息经济学中的委托-代理理论和船员人力资源市场特点,从定量的角度来确定船公司支付给船员的最优工资水平和船公司对船员的最优激励水平,提出并论证船公司可通过"锦标制度"这样一种激励机制来强化最优激励水平的激励效用。
The information asymmetry between the ship - owner and the crew leads to the problem that the lower quality crew drive out the higher ones in recruitment, while in the employment period the crew who are not working hard blame the bad performance and accidents for the adverse external environment, such as inferior oceanic condition and electrical equipment of the ship , rather than their laziness and negligence . Based on the principal - agent theory in in- formation economics and the characteristics of crew human resource market , this dissertation determines the optimal level of wage and incentive through the quantitative method, brings forward the tournaments for ship - owner and argues its strengthening for incentives.
出处
《浙江交通职业技术学院学报》
CAS
2013年第3期26-30,共5页
Journal of Zhejiang Institute of Communications
关键词
船员管理
人力资源
激励机制
crew management
human resources
incentive mechanism
