摘要
物流产业在国民经济的发展中发挥着重要作用,物流园区通过资源的整合和规模效应促进了现代物流产业的发展。但中国各地的物流园区盲目建设,已建成的物流园区同质化现象较严重,出现了空置率高、利用率低等问题,物流园区发展陷入了囚徒困境。本文运用赛局理论对各地方政府的物流园区发展策略选择进行探析,认为地方政府利益是影响策略选择的关键,而中央政府的干预行为是物流园区发展从囚徒困境到合作赛局的有效途径。
The logistics industry plays an important role in the development of the national economy. Via the Resource Integration and Scale Economies Effect, the logistics parks have promoted the development of the logistics industry. However, the unguided constructions of local logistics parks have caused the homogenization of the logistics park more and more seriously. Meanwhile, the phenomenon of high vacancy rate and low utilization rate led the development of logistics parks into a ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂. With the help of Game Theory, the strategy choice of local government in developing logistics parks is studied. The result of the paper revealed that the key point is the interests of the local government affected policy choices. And the intervention of the central government will be an effective way to transform the development of logistics parks from the ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂ to ＂Cooperative Game ＂.
出处
《中国流通经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第9期35-41,共7页
China Business and Market
关键词
物流园区
囚徒困境
赛局分析
地方政府利益
logistics parks
prisoner＇s dilemma
game analysis
government＇s interest
