摘要
本文首先对国际反倾销现状进行了分析 ,结果表明国际反倾销近 30年来愈演愈烈 ,尤其是对华反倾销的地位在急剧上升 ,究其原因是什么呢 ?作者建立了一个完全信息反倾销对抗博弈模型对此给予了理论解释 ,并经实证分析指出了在国际反倾销浪潮中我国少有对外反倾销申诉的成因 ,主要是专职管理投入不足、产业集中度低和不擅长反倾销博弈等 ,文末指出本模型在许多领域具有普遍的拓展应用前景 ,可以类推解释许多对抗博弈问题。
This paper first gives the status quo analysis of international antidumping, and its result have stated clearly that the status of anti-dumping to China are sharply rise with the durability of international anti-dumping,but what is the reason? Author gives a theoretical analyses by creating a anti-dumping counteract game model,and point out by positive analysis,in international anti-dumping tide,the reason which China have rarely the anti-dumping cases to foreign countries are mainly its inputs not enough, its industries concentration rate too low,and not expert in anti-dumping games,etc. At the end,it presents this model can continnations use in many game domainsand may explain many counteract game problems.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2000年第6期28-33,27,共7页
Forecasting
关键词
完全信息
反倾销
对抗博弈
交叉效应
产业集中度
complete information
anti-dumping
counteract game
cross effort
industry concentration rate
