摘要
土地资源是农村地区经济效益、社会效益和生态效益的纽带。集体土地内部违法是相对于行政主体土地违法而言,指村委会违反法律、法规等规范性法律文件使用集体土地的行为。对村委会违法行为分析,发现低效率的土地产权配置、土地产权增值力弱;土地的社会保障功能降低和农民与土地的生存逻辑并存。基层民主自治制度下,串通违法和隐蔽性强等行为特点使得法律等约束手段呈现地域排挤的边缘状态。以新制度经济学为视角,制度诱导与生态驱动结合,使主体从被动纳入到主动参与是解决问题的关键。变制度约束为诱导,提高产权配置效率、创新土地产权制度,破解农民与土地的生存逻辑;生态文明指引下的土地资源保护意识培育才能激发土地资源保护的内生动力,遏制违法行为发生,保护集体土地资源,最终促进新农村建设可持续发展。
Land resources are the link between economic, social and ecological benefits. Using the literature and empirical research, we interpret the theory of property rights and transaction costs and put forward the theory of two levels of collective land property rights. Through analysis of illegal acts by village committees, we found that land property rights are allocated inefficiently. The ability of collective land property rights appreciation is poor. The system of collective land property rights could not improve the sustainable and stable land benefit of farmers. As a result, the social security function of the land was extremely weak and the survival logic between peasants and collective land is inherent. In view of the grassroots democratic self-government system, that collusion and concealment are the typical features of the internally illegal acts makes the law and regulations squeezed and marginal. Combining institution inducting with ecology driving and making the subject from passive reception to active participation to abide by the laws are critical to solving these problems. Additionally, under an ecological civilization framework, enhancing the awareness of protecting collective land will curb illegal activities, protect precious collective land resources and promote the sustainable development of new rural construction.
出处
《资源科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第8期1542-1548,共7页
Resources Science
基金
西北农林科技大学人文社会学科专项基金(编号:2011RWZX04)
关键词
新制度经济学
集体土地
内部违法使用
制度诱导
生态驱动
New institutional economics
Collective land
Internal illegal activities on collective land use
Institution inducing
Ecology driving
