摘要
为了探查"庇古税"在我国现阶段低碳经济发展中的适用性,本文构建政府与企业之间三阶段博弈模型,分析我国碳税政策的可行性和方式选择问题。通过模型求解和数值仿真得出结论:对比统一碳税形式和差异化碳税形式后发现,两种碳税形式都不会提高我国的社会整体福利水平,统一碳税政策对社会整体福利水平造成的影响更大一些;目前,差异化碳税形式能够扩大低碳环保产品的市场占有份额,有利于促进低碳环保企业的发展,而统一碳税形式则会在市场中造成"逆向选择"问题;两种碳税形式都能促进企业研发低碳技术,差异化碳税形式更为有效;统一碳税形式使消费者注重产品价格属性,而差异化碳税形式使得消费者更加注重商品的环保属性,能够促使消费者更多的选择购买低碳环保产品。本文认为如果现阶段实施碳税政策,应该采取差异化碳税形式,而且征税的水平不宜过高;同时加大对企业低碳技术创新的财政支持力度。企业则要树立低碳战略理念,抓住投资机会,抢占产业制高点。
To examine the applicability of the ＇ Pigouvian tax＇ in China＇s present development of low-carbon economy, the paper built a three-stage game model between the government and enterprises to analyze the feasibility and mode selection of carbon tax policy. Through model solution and numerical simulation it concluded： When contrasted, unified carbon tax and differential carbon tax would not improve the level of social welfare as a whole, and unified carbon tax policy had greater impacts on the level of total social welfare; differential carbon tax could expand the market share of low-carbon environmental friendly products, which helped to promote the development of low-carbon environmental friendly enterprises, while unified carbon tax would bring forth the problem of ＇ adverse selection＇ in the marketplace; both forms of carbon taxes could promote enterprises to research and develop low-carbon technology while differential carbon tax was more effective; unified carbon tax enabled consumers to pay attention to the price attribute, while differential carbon tax made consumers pay more attention to the environmental friendliness of the commodity, and thus there were more low-carbon environmental friendly products bought by consumers. This paper argued that if the carbon tax policy was to be implemented at the present stage, differential carbon tax should be the chosen form, and the level of taxation should not be too high; there should also be increased financial supports for innovation in low-carbon technology of enterprises. The enterprise should establish the concept of low-carbon strategy, seize investment opportunities and command the heights of the industry.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期8-15,共8页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"权力范式下的经济非均衡研究"(编号:11JJD790049)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"博弈论与经济权力范式研究"(编号:2009JJD790017)
关键词
低碳经济
碳税
政府
博弈
low-carbon economy
carbon tax
government
game
