摘要
道德究竟根源于我们的理I生或者我们对外部世界和自身的理性认识，还是根源于我们自身的情感？自柏拉图以来，西方主流的理性主义哲学传统一直主张前者，而当代著名的美德伦理学家斯洛特（M．Slote）则主张后者。他认为人类天生的移情能力或移情反应，而非理性或外部世界的某种原因（如幸福或效果），才是我们理解道德、辩护道德和解释道德语义的最终依据。
According to Michael Slote's moral sentimentalism,some natural motivation in human nature,i.e.,certain kinds of empathic reactions,rather than reason or other external factors,ultimately determine or ground our moral judgments and duties.According to his meta-ethics,our moral attitudes are actually based upon our second-order empathic reactions to the agent or agential empathy,rather than our moral judgments;our moral judgments are assertions of the agent's character or acts that cause our second-order empathic reactions;we can use concepts formed from our empathic experiences to fix the reference of moral terms and thus we can know our moral judgments a priori.According to his normative sentimentalism,an act,that reflects the agent's character or agential empathy,is morally right if and only if it expresses or reflects the agent's empathic concern or care for others.One of the problems with Slote might be that empathy may not be the only factor that ultimately explains moral discourses and duties.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期102-110,129,共9页
Philosophical Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"西方美德伦理学问题的研究与创新"(编号09BZX053)
国家社科基金重大项目"西方道德哲学通史研究"(编号12&ZD122)
江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目的研究成果
