农民专业合作社信贷融资治理结构研究——基于交易费用理论的视角被引量：23

Studies on Credit Financing Mechanism in Specialized Farmer Cooperatives: Based on the Perspective of Transaction Cost Theory

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摘要在市场治理结构下,我国农民专业合作社贷款交易治理成本较高,信用能力不足,债务履约机制缺失。事实上,农民专业合作社信贷的交易属性表现为较高的资产专用性和较低的交易频率,这隐含着贷款交易合约的非完全性与风险性。从交易费用经济学关于交易属性与治理结构的匹配理论来看,农民专业合作社贷款交易治理应当适用供应链网络治理结构,采用新古典契约安排。由于自身禀赋缺陷,农民专业合作社并不适用于保兑仓、融通仓模式和存货质押模式;而财产受益权嵌入治理结构则能契合农民专业合作社的禀赋特性和农地规模化集约化经营的改革取向。 In the traditional credit extension loan pattern,because of market governance structure don' mismatching with transaction attribute and contractual arrangements.Those cause Farmer Specialized Cooperatives credit ability is insufficient.In the new classical contract relationship,Supply chain network governance structure could reduce transaction costs as well as improve credit ability and establish debt performance mechanism by benefits associated,duty bound,allocation of risks and joint administration.Because of its own endowment defect,Beneficial interest embedded can be suitable for Farmers' Specialized Cooperative.

作者韦克游

机构地区广西农业科学院农业经济研究所

出处《农业经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期62-69,111-112,共8页 Issues in Agricultural Economy

关键词治理结构交易费用交易属性农民专业合作社信贷融资

分类号 F832.4 [经济管理—金融学] F321.42 [经济管理—产业经济]

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