摘要
处理好流域流经各地政府间的利益均衡问题,是我国流域生态补偿研究和实践中的重点。从博弈论的角度探讨了流域生态补偿中流域上下游地方政府与上级政府间的行为和利益问题,建立了跨区域流域生态补偿府际间三方博弈模型。分析表明:跨区域流域生态补偿需要流域上下游地方政府和上级政府的共同参与,并以确保上游地方政府收益为手段推动流域生态补偿全局;上级政府通过建立健全流域生态补偿的准市场机制,使流域上游地方政府的保护行为和下游地方政府的补偿行为成为府际间三方博弈的长期稳定均衡。最后,还对建立流域生态补偿的准市场机制提出了建议。
It is the principal contradiction when different government wants to carry out the interests of consultation in fiver basin ecological compensation in China. So trying to deal with the balance of interests is the key to establish the mechanism of the across administration area fiver basin ecological compensation. The study explores the behavior and interests of the basin upstream local government with the downstream local government and their superior＇s government from the perspective of the game theory, then puts forward a tripartite game mode. The results show that the fiver basin ecological compensation requires appropriate intervention of the superiors government. Inorder to achieve the purpose the maximize income of the upper local government has to be ensured. Building the quasi-market of river basin ecological compensation could help to be a players. Finally, suggestions are given for establishing river long-term stable equilibrium tripartite game among three basin ecological compensation quasi-market.
出处
《科技与管理》
2013年第2期92-97,共6页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(70973013)
教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目(11JHQ031)
辽宁经济社会发展重点课题(2011 lslktzdian-01)
辽宁省社会科学规划项目一般项目(L10BJY018)
关键词
跨行政区域
流域生态补偿
三方博弈
准市场
across administration area
river basin ecological compensation
tripartite game
quasi-market
