摘要
在随机需求条件下,建立了上游制造商技术创新投入降低生产成本的供应链博弈模型。研究发现,在分散决策情况下,制造商的创新投入无法达到供应链整体最优,为此提出了使供应链达到协调的数量折扣契约,结果证明这样的数量折扣有无穷多个;进一步指出了该契约可以为各方接受所需的条件,并对供应链协调后的利润分配问题进行探讨。
A supply chain game model about upstream technological innovation investment to decrease manufacture costs is constructed. The research illustrates that decentralized decision of the manufacturer＇ s innovation investment cannot coordinate the supply chain. A contract of supply chain coordination based on quantity discount schedule is proposed. The resuits show that manufacturer can provide infinite quantity discounts for coordination of supply chain. Furthermore, the conditions which are feasible to all supply chain members are pointed out, and an analysis on sharing the after - coordination profits is Dresented.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期144-147,153,共5页
Science and Technology Management Research
关键词
供应链
随机需求
技术创新
数量折扣
supply chain
stochastic demand
technological innovation
quantity discount
