摘要
考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,制造商以批发价格为零售商提供一种产品,零售商再以零售价格将产品销售给顾客;制造商可以做广告来提高销售量,零售商的零售价格和制造商的广告不仅对本期的需求有影响,而且对下期的需求也有影响。在这样的条件下刻画两周期的需求函数,提出一个两周期动态定价和广告联合模型。在集中式供应链下,采用两阶段逆向归纳法给出两周期定价和广告决策,分析价格敏感系数和广告敏感系数对决策的影响;在分散式供应链下,制造商为Stackelberg博弈的领导者,零售商为追随者,采用四阶段逆向归纳法给出两周期定价和广告决策的均衡解,并给出了批发价格协调供应链的条件。结果表明,下期的定价和广告决策很大程度上依赖于本期的定价和广告决策。
A supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered in the paper. The manufacturer supplies a product with wholesale price, and then the retailer sells the product to costumer with retail price. Especially, the manufacturer can increase costumer demand with advertisement. In additional, the retail price and advertising level not only have influence on the current period demand but also the next period demand. Under these conditions, the next period demand is depicted and a two-period dynamic pricing and advertising model is developed. In centralized supply chain, a two-period dynamic pricing and advertising strategy is given by a two-stage backward induction. The influence of price sensitive coefficient and advertising sensitive coefficient on decision is analyzed. In decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer is the leader in Stackelberg game and the retailer is the follower. The pricing and advertising equilibrium are given by a four-stage backward induction. Furthermore, the conditions of supply chain coordination are showed. The results show that the next period decisions lie much on the current period decisions.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2006年第6期42-47,共6页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70571088)
欧亚合作项目(ASI/B7-301/98/679-023)
亚洲IT&C项目(ASI/B7-301/3152-099/71553)
关键词
供应链
动态定价
广告水平
逆向归纳法
批发价格
协调
supply chain
dynamic pricing
advertising level
backward induction
wholesale price
coordination
