摘要
环境政策领域使用较为普遍的管制方法是命令-控制工具和市场类工具,但现实中涌现越来越多的自愿性环境保护协议。通过建立私人企业单边联合供给模型,对该现象进行经济学分析,为由大量企业自发合作和形成自愿环境协议的不可能性提供理论支持,并模拟给出自愿环境协议的最优规模和大小。
More commonly used control methods in the field of environmental policy are the command - control tools and market tools ; however, there are more and more voluntary environmental agreements. Based on the model of unilateral joint supply by the private en- terprises, the paper makes an economic analysis of the phenomena, which provides theoretical support for the impossibility of voluntary cooperation and the formation of voluntary environmental agreements, and further simulates the optimal size.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期72-76,共5页
Economic Survey
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(11YJC630181)
中国博士后科学基金(20100471403)
江苏省博士后科研资助项目(1001079C)
中国矿业大学社会科学基金(0J091182)
关键词
环境保护
单边协议
自愿供给
最优规模
Environmental Protection
Unilateral Agreement
Voluntarily Supply
Optimal Size
