摘要
从单个供应商和单个零售商组成的二级服装供应链出发,研究供应商不提供和提供回购契约时供应链整体和各参与成员的效益变化情况;根据供应链中零售商地位的不同,分别研究了Stackelberg博弈模型和Nash协商均衡博弈模型的回购契约。通过算例的数值计算,验证了当供应商提供Nash协商均衡博弈模型的回购契约时,供应链的效益会得到最合理的提升。
The paper mainly studies the change in the profit about the supply chain in a life-cycle with or without repurchase contract. According to the different status of the retailer, this paper exploits Stack- elberg game model and Nash equilibrium game model. By the data simulation, the authors verify that the rise on the profit of the supply chain is the most reasonable when the supplier provides the repurchase con- tract under Nash equilibrium game model.
出处
《浙江理工大学学报（自然科学版）》
2013年第1期40-45,共6页
Journal of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University(Natural Sciences)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(11071220
11271324
11201428)
浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y6110091
Y6090554)
浙江省教育厅项目(Y201019076)
关键词
服装供应链
博弈
回购契约
效益最大化
fashion supply chain
game
repurchase contract
benefit maximum
