摘要
利用委托代理理论,建立了一个基于声誉机制的经理人动态激励模型,将企业的短期业绩和长期业绩通过经理人的当前努力和长远努力动态地联系起来,以形成短期激励和长期激励相结合的激励模式,根据分析得出了不同经理人的努力成本、短期激励的程度等都对企业的长期业绩和经理人的行为选择有显著影响,进而也通过实例验证了模型的合理性和适用性。
By using a principal and agent theory,a model of dynamic optimal incentive contract for managers is developed based on companies＇ future performance achieved by managers＇ long-term and short-term effort.Conditions for achieving effective reputation and ways to enhance incentive effect are presented.It is shown that incentive strategy and managerial effort have great impact on companies＇ future performance.The rationality and applicability of the model are illustrated by practical cases.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2012年第6期126-131,共6页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
中央高校科研基金资助项目(916061004)
教育部人文社科资助项目(09yja630034)
河北省科技计划软科学资助项目(11457201D-37)
关键词
委托代理
激励
动态契约
principal and agent
incentive
dynamic incentive contract
