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厂商产品线设计的委托代理分析 被引量：4

The Analysis on the Principal-Agent Model of a Product Line Design
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摘要 本文通过委托代理理论研究了厂商的产品线设计问题。在厂商进行产品线设计时 ,厂商需要根据不同的消费者偏好设计不同的产品 ,但是厂商不能明确的分别消费者的偏好 ,因此厂商与消费者存在着信息不对称现象 ,为了攫取利益的最大化 ,厂商通过提供甄别契约 ,让消费者进行自选择 ,有效的对消费者进行了区分 (即对市场进行了有效分割 )。本文以简单的案例分析入手 ,然后将其推广。对在信息不对称情况下厂商如何提供甄别契约进行产品线设计进行了较为详尽的分析 。 In the competition strategy,an important question is how a firm can optimally design and price a product.In this paper,we make a detailed analysis about how a firm design the screening contract to find the best solution in the circumstance of information asymmetry and derive the general conclusion.
作者 李善良 左敏 朱道立
机构地区 复旦大学管理学院
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第1期117-121,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家重大自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 432 0 0 1 )
关键词 供应链契约 产品线设计 不对称信息 信息甄别 委托代理 Supply chain contracts product line design information asymmetry screening principal-agent
分类号 F27 [经济管理—企业管理]
  • 相关文献

参考文献17

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二级参考文献16

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共引文献104

同被引文献34

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引证文献4

二级引证文献33

中国管理科学
2005年 第1期

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