摘要
基于合谋理论构建了科技财政经费监管中各主体合谋行为的博弈模型并对科技财政经费监管中的合谋活动进行分析。结果表明:治理科技财政经费监管中的合谋活动,关键是加大对合谋主体的惩罚力度,提高政府的监管质量,制定完善的经费监管办法。并提出合谋瓦解机制设计思路:一是构建科技经费监管方合理激励与约束机制;二是构建有效监管处罚机制,加大合谋惩罚成本;三是完善制衡式监管制度,瓦解合谋行为。
According to the collusion and game theory, a game model about the gambling behaviors in the scientific financial appropriation supervision was constructed and analyzed. The result of the game analysis demonstrated that the key of collusion-overthrow in Appropriation Supervision is increasing sanctions to the main body, as well as improving the quality of government regulation, drawing up im- peccable regulatory measures. The mechanism design of collusion-overthrow is as follows： first, con- structing reasonable incentive and restraint mechanisms of the auditor; second, constructing effective and reasonable punishment mechanism of appropriation supervision to increase the collusion cost; and third, improving the scientific financial
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》
CAS
2012年第11期27-31,共5页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）
基金
重庆市科委计划项目"重庆市科技经费监管体系及财务考评规范研究"(2010KW018)
重庆市高校教改项目"基于ISO9000理念的一般院校人才培养质量监控模式研究与实践"(2008JG013)成果之一
关键词
经费监管
合谋
博弈论
机制设计
appropriation supervision
appropriation supervision system. collusion
game theory
mechanism design
