摘要
客户企业实施应用服务外包时,面临着成本信息不对称所带来的风险。针对该问题,以客户企业期望收入最大化为目标,在应用服务提供商(Application Service Provider,ASP)所拥有的成本效率参数及努力水平不可观测下研究客户企业如何通过服务外包菜单式合约的设计激励ASP付出最优的努力水平,并显示出真实的成本信息。研究表明,收益共享系数是成本效率参数、风险规避度、产出方差的减函数;客户企业向ASP支付的期望服务报酬除了补偿保留效用与服务生产成本还将额外支付风险成本、信息租金;风险成本随风险规避度、产出方差递增,随成本效率参数递减;信息租金随风险规避度、产出方差、成本效率参数递减。
There exists risk caused by asymmetric cost information when customer enterprise is carrying out application service outsourcing. Focused on this problem, the outsourcing menu contract is designed to in- centive the ASP to show the true cost information and pay the optimal effort level under the circumstance of cost-effectiveness parameter and effort level owned by the ASP cannot be observed by the customer en- terprise. The conclusions imply that revenue-sharing proportion is the decreasing function of cost-effective- ness parameter, degree of risk aversion, and the variance of output; the reward which customer enterprise pays to ASP will be used not only to compensate reservation utility, service cost, but also to compensate the risk cost and information rent; the risk cost is decreasing with the degree of risk aversion, the variance of output, and increasing with the cost-effectiveness parameter; the information rent is decreasing with de- gree of risk aversion, the variance of output and cost-effectiveness parameter.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期142-151,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871128)
国家863计划资助课题(2012AA040904)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0884)
