摘要
信息不对称是解释IPO折价原因的主要假说之一.承销商和风险投资作为资本市场的主要金融中介,能有效发挥声誉效应,降低信息不对称程度,从而对IPO风险企业折价产生重要影响.文中创新性地提出了衡量承销商和风险投资声誉的新尺度,并发现这两种声誉对风险企业的折价率具有显著的影响作用,而且高声誉的风险投资能吸引高声誉的承销商,验证了风险投资的核证作用,支持了有关IPO折价的信息不对称假说.对于揭示IPO折价的原因,验证承销商、风险投资的声誉效应,探索风险投资的作用机制与退出策略,形成有效的资本市场声誉机制,指导投资者理性投资等,都具有重要的理论和现实意义.
Information asymmetry is one of main hypotheses that can be used to explain IPO underpricing. As the principal financial intermediaries in capital markets, underwriters and venture capital can exert the reputation effect and reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and therefore impose effects on the un derpricing of venture-backed firms. The article innovatively puts forward the new measurements of venture capital and underwriter reputations, and finds that the reputations have significant effects on underpricing of venture backed firms. Moreover, it proves that the higher reputation venture capital can attract higher reputation underwriters, which verifies the certificating role of venture capital and supports the information asymmetry hypothesis on IPO underpricing. The research plays an important role in showing the cause of IPO underpricing, verifying the reputation effects of underwriter and venture capital, probing the opera tion mechanism and exit strategies of venture capital, forming effective reputation mechanism in capital market and directing investors to invest rationally.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第9期1509-1515,共7页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金
上海市教委重点学科建设项目(J51601)
上海市教委科研创新项目(12ys145)
上海市教委"上海高校青年教师培养资助计划"(sjr11001)
上海市高等教育学会2012规划课题(ZCGJ51-12)
上海市教育科学研究项目(B12057)
上海金融学院2011年校级重点课程建设项目(KCYZ 11-32)
关键词
首次公开发行
折价
信息不对称
风险企业
风险投资
承销商
声誉
initial public offering （IPO）
underpricing
information asymmetry
venture-backed firm
venture capital
underwriter
reputation
