摘要
当前各国公司治理都实施统一的董事会治理监管,然而公司经营环境复杂,最优董事会是否是内生性的争论成为近年来公司治理关注的焦点。本文以CEO寻租空间、监督成本等构建最优董事会抉择模型,研究发现:治理成本的存在,使得CEO寻租空间对董事会规模和独立董事比例有积极影响,而监督成本对二者有负面影响;从边际治理成本角度,最优董事会与其独立性存在一定程度的替代性。我国1999～2008年上市公司实证研究发现:一定监管条规下,最优规模与独立性的替代假说成立,鉴于公司经营差异性,僵化的监管制度将提升治理成本,造成董事会效率低下。由此,建议监管机构从治理执行效果出发,考虑最优董事会的相机抉择行为,采用柔性化的监管条规,提高公司治理绩效。
The board composition of company is usually conducted by regulative institutions in many countries. However, facing heterogeneity and complicacy of firms in competitive environment, the optimal board character may be endogenously determined. Firstly, this paper presents a theoretical model on the optimal size and inde- pendency of board determined by CEO＇S power of rent-seeking and governing costs. It finds out ： （ 1 ） CEO＇s ca- pability of rent-seeking has a positive impact on board size and proportion of independent directors ; （2） Opti- mal size and independency of board is negatively correlated with governing costs ; and （3） Board size is substi- tutable for independent directors＇ ratio under certain regulation. Further, the empirical studies have verified the- oretical conclusions and assumptions by Chinese listed companies from 1999-2008. As a result, it implies that regulative institutions shall take account of endogenous board characters and take the flexible regulations in or- der to improve really the efficiency of corporate governance in China.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第8期125-138,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划课题“制度变迁下的公司股权结构及其绩效研究”(批准号:11YJA790180)
教育部青年规划课题(批准号:07JC630057)
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(批准号:2008BJB018)的资助
关键词
公司治理
最优董事会
寻租空间
监督成本
董事会内生性
Corporate governance, Optimal board, Capability of rent-seeking, Governing cost, Endogeneity ofboard
