摘要
近代行会在限制恶性竞争、规定生产或业务范围、调节纠纷和维持市场秩序等方面发挥了积极的作用。行会行规中都有对违规者实施惩罚策略的条例,利用博弈论的研究方法,从历史比较制度的视角分析这种策略发挥作用的机理,认为行会中的多边惩罚策略是一种制度均衡,具有自我实施的特点,在国家法律供给相对不足时期,具有惩罚内容的行规起到了习惯法的作用。
Guilds played active roles in confining competition,regulating producing or business scope,coordinating dispute and maintaining the market orders.There are many rules about multiple punishment strategies.The paper analyzes the reason how the mechanism ran was by historical institutions.It concludes that strategy was an institutional equilibrium,and was self-enforcing.During the period that the country relatively lacked formal law to restrict the guilds operations,so the industrial rules with punishment mechanism played roles as common law.
出处
《上海金融学院学报》
2012年第3期79-87,96,共10页
Journal of Shanhai Finance University
基金
国家社科基金项目"民国上海同业公会与企业外部环境研究"[04BZS031]
关键词
行会
行规
博弈论
多边惩罚机制
历史比较制度分析
Guilds
Industrial Rules
Game Theory
Multiple Punishment Mechanism
Historical Comparative Institution Analysis
