摘要
文章从博弈论的角度论证了声誉效应对国有企业造假行为的抑制。文章以审计收费模型为突破口,论证了检查风险的概率可以在声誉效应的作用下得到降低。最后得出结论,声誉效应是一种有效控制国有企业审计风险的机制,它的形成是国有企业、监管机构和会计师事务所三者之间长期博弈均衡与合作的结果。
Based on a game model, reputation effect was proved to be an useful factor to inhibit the stateowned enterprise accounting fraud. The detection risk can be decrease under the impact of reputation effective through an audit charge model. Finally,the author shows the reputation effect is an effective system to control the state-owned enterprise audit risk, which will be the result of the game equilibrium aonong the state-owned enterprise, financial regulator and accounting services.
出处
《西安财经学院学报》
CSSCI
2012年第4期108-111,共4页
Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics
基金
陕西省社会科学基金项目(11Q024)
关键词
声誉效应
国有企业
审计风险控制
博弈模型
审计收费模型
reputation effects
state-owned enterprise
audit risk control
game model
audit charge model
