摘要
农业保险的高风险性、高赔付率、高亏损率特征及其准公共物品的属性,决定了政府支持是农业保险发展的必要条件。而政府、保险公司和投保农户之间的信息不对称问题,会引发道德风险而降低政府补贴的使用效率。本文构建了Stackelberg博弈模型分析这种效率损失,并应用Kreps模型分析了博弈双方预期补贴政策变动时的策略性反应,进而提出了降低这种效率损失的对策,即政府补贴政策的设计与运行应力求克服信息不对称性。
The high risk, high claims, high loss ratio and quasi-public goods properties of agricultural insurance determine that government support is an indispensable factor for its development. However, the existence of information asymmetry among government, insurers and rural households will give rise to moral hazards and the low usage effi- ciency of government subsidies. The paper constructed the Stackelberg game model to analyze the efficiency loss, and applied the Kreps model to analyze both gaming parties＇ strategic response when anticipating the change of sub- sidy policy. On the basis of the abovementioned analysis, the paper offered suggestions on how to reduce such effi- ciency loss, namely how to overcome information asymmetry in subsidy oolicy design and operations.
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期58-63,共6页
Insurance Studies
基金
国家社科基金重点项目(11AJY014)
教育部人文社科基金规划项目(10YJA790190)
对外经济贸易大学企业风险管理团队项目资助
