摘要
独立董事的治理行为受到所处社会网络的影响。基于"董事在董事会同时任职的直接或间接联结关系"而形成的董事网络,本文利用社会网络分析方法检验了独立董事的网络特征对其发挥在促进高管激励有效性影响中的作用机理。结果发现:公司独立董事网络中心度越高,高管薪酬-业绩敏感性越强;与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司中独立董事网络中心度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的正相关关系更弱;进一步研究发现,用独立董事网络中心度解释的高管薪酬部分对未来业绩有促进作用。结论丰富了"网络和治理"研究的证据。
We explore the governance role of independent directors based on the social network. Specifically, we choose the board network defined by relations constructed by interlocked directors, and use social network analysis method to explore the effects of the board network on the governance role of independent directors in executive incentives. We document that, independent directors＇ board network centrality can enhance the executives＇ pay - performance sensitivity. Compared with non - SOEs, this effect is weaker in SOEs, which implies the direct or indirect regulation of the SOEs＇ executive incentives can reduce board network＇s influence. Additional analysis shows that the compensation components explained by board network can indeed improve companies＇ future performance. Our results have benefits to the ＂evidence of social network and corporate governance＂.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期168-182,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金(71172010)
教育部“博士生学术新人奖”、教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20100002110060)
中央财经大学“211工程”重点学科建设项目
北京市教育委员会共建项目资助
关键词
董事网络
高管激励
社会网络分析
独立董事
Board network
Executive compensation
Social network analysis
Independent director
