摘要
佣金制度在激励保险代理人行为方面起着重要的作用,但是一味地提高佣金也可能导致保险代理人的短视行为,该文利用实验经济学的方法根据我国保险市场的特征设计了相应的实验,通过实验验证了佣金率的提高对保险代理人行为的促进性,但同时也发现随着被试交易经验的丰富,超过一定程度的佣金率也会促使保险代理人采取违规行为进行展业。
The commission system played a vital role in encouraging insurance agent behavior, but improving constantly the commission may lead to the insurance agent＇s shortsightedness. The article designs a corresponding experiment based on the characteristics of insurance market with the method of economics experiment, the experiment verifies the promoter action of increasing commission rates to insurance agent behavior, and finds that high commission rates above some extent can lead insurance agent work with foul behavior.
出处
《通化师范学院学报》
2012年第1期39-42,共4页
Journal of Tonghua Normal University
关键词
佣金制度
佣金率
保险代理人行为
实验研究
commission system
commission rate
insurance agent behavior
experimental study
